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We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and 
active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. 
In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive 
markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in 
high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment 
opportunities and low merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the same is not so in countries that 
have low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to 







Parallel with the growth in the size of the industrial unit has come a dispersion in 
its ownership such that an important part of the wealth of individuals consists of 
interests in great enterprises of which no one individual owns a major part. A 
rapidly increasing proportion of wealth appears to be taking this form and there is 
much to indicate that the increase will continue. 
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
 
There is a common view, which can be traced back to Berle and Means (1932) and Chandler 
(1977), that firms evolve over time from closely held, family-owned enterprises into 
managerially controlled, widely held corporations. In accordance with this “life cycle” view, 
family control should be negatively correlated with firm age.  
There is some evidence to support this view.  Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) find 
that shareholder concentration declines over time in U.S. firms following their initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and stocks that are more liquid tend to become widely held more quickly. 
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) show that in UK firms, shareholder concentration is diluted 
over time as a result of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In a comprehensive study of IPO 
firms in thirty-four countries, Foley and Greenwood (2010) find that shareholder concentration 
decreases faster in firms within countries in which there is stronger investor protection than in 
countries with weaker investor protection. 
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We contribute to this literature by analyzing the evolution, over time and across 
countries, of family control in listed and private firms.1 Our focus is therefore on family control, 
rather than shareholder concentration, in private as well as public firms. Family control is 
important because it dominates many financial markets around the world. Focusing on private, as 
well as public, firms is important because the decision to go public is endogenous; hence, 
looking only at listed firms may give a biased measure of the evolution of family ownership in a 
country.  
Our analysis is based on two separate datasets of nonfinancial European firms—one 
detailed panel drawn from the four largest economies (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and Italy), which includes 4,654 firms, and one larger cross-section of twenty-seven European 
countries, which includes 27,684 firms. The novel features of these data are that they cover a 
large number of unlisted firms, and they include their ultimate owners and track ownership over 
time.  
The proposition underlying our analysis is that the degree of investor protection, the 
development of financial markets, and the activity of the market for corporate control determine 
                                                
1 Most studies of family ownership have exclusively focused on listed firms. For example, La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) sample the twenty largest publicly traded companies in each of twenty-seven countries; 
Faccio and Lang (2002) consider 5,232 publicly traded companies in Western Europe; Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
focus on listed Fortune 500 corporations; and Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) select the largest 2,000 U.S. 
industrial firms from Compustat. Exceptions are Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), who study management practices 
in 732 private manufacturing firms in the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; Almeida et al. 
(2011), who analyze ultimate ownership for both private and listed firms in Korean chaebol groups; and Giannetti 
(2003) studies the capital structure choices of 61,557 mostly private European firms and obtains direct shareholder 
data from Amadeus. 
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the prevalence and speed of the family control life cycle. We define the transition from a family 
firm to a widely held firm as happening whenever newly issued shares or sales of all (or part) of 
the family’s existing shares cause family control to fall below a threshold of 25% of voting rights 
(held directly or via a control chain). We investigate three factors that might cause this to 
happen—investment opportunities, external financing requirements, and M&A activity—and 
exploit their industry-level differences. Specifically, if family firms become widely held through 
the channels of investment opportunities, external financing, and M&A activity, then we expect 
family control to be reduced or to disappear in industries in which the levels of investment 
opportunities, external financing, and M&A activity are high. Thus, we expect the incidence of 
family ownership to be related to industry-specific economic factors, namely, growth 
opportunities (Foley and Greenwood 2010), the need for external financing (Rajan and Zingales 
1998), and M&A activity (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Harford 2005).  
We begin our analysis by focusing on four countries: France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom can be regarded as having strong investor protection, 
high financial development, and active markets for corporate control; whereas France, Germany, 
and Italy are regarded as having weak investor protection, low financial development, and less 
active markets for corporate control. Keeping this in mind, we expect UK family firms to follow 
the ownership life cycle theory more closely than do their Continental European counterparts. 
Our results are consistent with this prediction. First, we find a strong negative correlation 
between family control and firm age in the United Kingdom—the older a firm, the less likely it is 
to be family controlled—whereas we find no such relation in the other three countries. If 
anything, older firms in France, Germany, and Italy are more likely to be family controlled. 
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Second, over a ten-year period, UK family firms have a significantly lower chance of remaining 
family controlled than do French, German, and Italian family firms.  
As an illustration, consider a firm that was family controlled at incorporation. In the 
United Kingdom, if this firm survives, then it has just over a 75% probability of remaining a 
family firm forty years later and a 30% probability of remaining a family firm 150 years later. In 
Continental Europe if the firm survives, then it is expected to remain family controlled 
throughout time. 
We also find that high investment opportunities and M&A activity lead to the 
disappearance of family firms in the United Kingdom but not in France, Germany, and Italy. UK 
family firms are concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities, low needs for 
external financing, and low M&A activity, while in France, Germany, and Italy these three 
factors have no effect on family control. These results hold for both private and listed firms, and 
they persist after controlling for the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual class 
shares and pyramids (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002). 
We then examine whether these results hold for a broader sample of twenty-seven 
countries that have greater variability of investor protection, financial development, and markets 
for corporate control. We find a negative correlation between family control and firm age in 
countries that have strong investor protection, high financial development, active markets for 
corporate control, and high aggregate scores of all three but no correlation in countries with low 
scores. We also observe that family control is lower in industries that have better investment 
opportunities, greater external dependence, and higher M&A activity in countries that have high 
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scores in investor protection, financial development, and corporate control but not in countries 
with low scores. 
In summary, our evidence points to a life cycle of family control in countries with strong 
investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control but not 
in other countries. This dilution of control is stronger in sectors with better investment 
opportunities, more external financing requirements, and higher M&A activity.  
One of the contributions of our article is to emphasize the role of mergers and 
acquisitions in the evolution of family ownership.  We do so in three ways. First, at the industry 
level, we measure the opportunities for synergistic gains through mergers and acquisitions by the 
volume of industry M&A activity. Our prediction is that in industries with more M&A activity, 
family firms have a greater propensity to dilute their controlling stake by issuing new shares to 
buy other companies and to sell their control stake for a takeover premium. Consistent with this 
prediction, we find that in industries with more M&A activity, family control is less common. 
This effect is more pronounced in countries with less concentrated ownership, i.e., in the United 
Kingdom in our four-country analysis, and in countries with strong investor protection, high 
financial development and active markets for corporate control in our twenty-seven-country 
analysis. Second, at the country level, we argue that the evolution of family ownership is affected 
by the efficiency of the market for corporate control. As suggested by Manne (1965) and Jensen 
(1988), hostile takeovers are a powerful disciplining device for managers of widely held 
corporations. If families choose to sell their controlling stake in a firm, they will be able to do so 
at higher prices in countries in which widely held firms face lower agency costs because of more 
efficient markets for corporate control. In our twenty-seven–country analysis we find support for 
this prediction. Family control decreases with firm age only in countries with more active 
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markets for corporate control. Third, at the firm level, we make use of the more detailed 
information available for listed firms in order to understand the exact channel through which 
M&A activity affects the evolution of family ownership. As targets, family firms are more likely 
to be taken over in the United Kingdom than in Continental Europe. As acquirers, UK family 
firms are more likely to evolve into widely held firms as a result of stock-financed acquisitions. 
Using the sample of listed firms, we also examine how family-controlled businesses 
become widely held. The evidence shows that primary issues are the single most important 
channel and are responsible for about half of the transitions from family control to widely held 
corporation. Secondary sales—in the form of block trades and open market sales—explain the 
remaining cases. Primary equity issues (to finance acquisitions) are particularly important in the 
United Kingdom, which suggests that the larger use of equity financing is an important 
explanation for the life cycle differences between UK and Continental European family firms. 
This is consistent with Foley and Greenwood (2010)’s evidence on firms just after the IPO, 
where ownership concentration declines over time in strong investor protection countries as a 
result of new equity issues, rather than secondary equity sales. 
The structure of the remainder of the article is as follows. Section 1 reviews the existing 
literature and develops the testable hypotheses. Data and methodology are described in Section 
2. The evolution of ownership over the decade of the panel data is analyzed in Section 3; Section 
4 describes the larger cross-sectional results; and Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
1. Hypotheses 
In accordance with the life cycle view of family ownership (which can be traced back to Berle 
and Means 1932 and Chandler 1977), firms evolve over time from closely held, family-owned 
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enterprises into managerially-controlled, widely held corporations. Family control therefore 
should be negatively correlated with firm age.  
There are several reasons for believing that the evolution of family into widely held firms 
significantly varies across countries. Founding families face the choice between forgoing 
control—by diluting their ownership through share issues or sales of their own equity stakes in 
order to grow as much as possible—and keeping control and using internal resources and debt to 
finance growth. Both options come with costs and benefits that are likely to vary across 
countries. The “law and finance” view argues that investor protection is a primary determinant of 
dispersion of ownership of firms (La Porta et al. 1998). The argument is that with weak investor 
protection, widely held companies are subject to severe agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, which large blockholders can overcome because of their greater incentives to 
monitor managers. Concentrated ownership (in the hands of families) naturally emerges as a 
solution to managerial agency conflicts in countries with weak investor protection. The law and 
finance view therefore predicts that family firms will be more persistent in countries with weak 
investor protection, and they will use internal funds and debt, rather than equity, to finance 
investment. Conversely, agency problems should be lower in widely held firms that are in strong 
investor protection countries, making families more willing to relinquish control in these 
regimes.2 Foley and Greenwood’s (2010) evidence on the ownership concentration in IPO firms 
is consistent with this view. 
                                                
2 A similar result emerges when considering the size of private benefits of control across countries. According to 
Zingales (1995) and Bebchuk (1999), controlling shareholders enjoy large private benefits of control and often at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Families may be reluctant to give up control, even when it is value increasing for 
other shareholders because of the private benefits they forgo. Hence, this theory predicts that, in line with the law 
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A second reason for why agency costs might also be lower in high investor protection 
countries is due to the market for corporate control. According to Manne (1965), Jensen (1988), 
and Scharfstein (1988) markets in corporate control—particularly in the form of hostile 
takeovers—diminish the agency problems that are created by the separation of ownership and 
control in firms with dispersed shareholders.  They thereby raise the value that large shareholders 
derive from selling their controlling shareholdings to dispersed shareholders on stock markets.  
Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue that at the IPO stage firms 
choose to affect the structure of shareholdings in order to discourage or facilitate control by 
external investors.  With lower agency control costs by external dispersed shareholders in the 
presence of markets for corporate control, the balance between the private benefit of retaining 
family and the value of selling it through public sales of equity shifts towards the latter.  We 
therefore hypothesize that families are more likely to forgo control in countries in which there is 
an active market for corporate control.  The ownership life cycle should therefore be more 
evident in countries with higher levels of hostile takeover activity.3  
A third reason for differences across countries in the life cycle is the degree of financial 
development and the liquidity of financial markets. The argument in Helwege, Pirinsky, and 
Stulz (2007) borrows from the literature on price pressure in equity markets (see, e.g., Coval and 
Stafford 2007): blockholders are more reluctant to sell if the market is less liquid because of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
and finance literature, concentrated ownership (in the hands of families) will be more likely to persist over time in 
countries with larger private benefits of control. 
3 Jensen (1988) and Scharfstein (1988) describe how hostile takeovers and the threat of hostile takeovers perform a 
disciplinary function on managers of widely held corporations alongside such considerations as economies of scale 
and scope that motivate other acquisitions and mergers. We therefore use the frequency of attempted hostile 
takeovers as our empirical proxy for the market for corporate control. 
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negative price-pressure that the sale may have on the stock price. They find that within the 
United States, stocks that are more liquid (as measured by high turnover) tend to become widely 
held more quickly. Foley and Greenwood (2010) find similar evidence for international IPOs. In 
accordance with this view, greater financial development leads to higher liquidity of financial 
markets and may consequently increase the incentives for controlling families to sell equity. We 
therefore expect that the life cycle view applies to family firms in countries that have greater 
financial development and liquid financial markets and applies less—or not at all—to family 
firms in countries that have low financial development. 
These three reasons lead us to expect that firm age is more negatively correlated with 
family control in countries that have stronger investor protection, more active markets for 
corporate control, and greater financial development than in other countries. 
We also wish to explore how family firms become nonfamily controlled. The controlling 
family faces a trade-off between keeping control and diluting or selling their controlling stake. 
For our analysis, we define a family firm as one in which a family controls at least 25% of voting 
rights, held directly or via a control chain whose links all exceed the 25% threshold, as we 
discuss in great detail in Section 2. A change from family firm into nonfamily firm therefore 
occurs whenever newly issued shares or selling all (or part) of the family’s existing shares cause 
family control to fall below the 25% threshold. We investigate two main channels that can cause 
this to happen. 
1) Investment opportunities: Better investment opportunities, keeping everything else 
fixed, create a need for external financing. If this involves the issuance of equity, taking 
advantage of investment opportunities will dilute the stake of the controlling family. The main 
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effect therefore of a positive shock to investment opportunities should be new equity issues and 
dilution of family ownership.  
2) M&A activity: If a family firm faces an increase in M&A activity (such as an industry-
specific merger wave), this can affect the family’s trade-off in two ways—both of which work 
against family control. As a buyer, a family may issue shares in the family firm to finance 
acquisitions (issues can be secondary offerings or stock-financed acquisitions). As a seller, a 
family may use the opportunity to sell its existing shares for cash and reap takeover premia. The 
effect of a positive shock to M&A activity should therefore be new equity issues and block 
trades or both. 
Country investor protection and industry investment opportunities should interact (as in 
Foley and Greenwood 2010): family stakes are diluted in firms that raise additional equity to 
finance investment opportunities and engage in M&A activity, in countries in which investor 
protection is strong, financial markets are developed, and the market for corporate control is 
active.  We therefore predict that in countries that have stronger investor protection, more active 
markets for corporate control, and greater financial development, family ownership will be more 
concentrated in industries with lower investment opportunities and with lower M&A activity.  
Finally, in accordance with the life cycle view of ownership, industry- and country-level 
determinants of family control should also interact with firm age. In industries that have higher 
investment opportunities and higher M&A activity, firm age should be more negatively 
correlated with family ownership if investor protection is strong, financial markets are 
developed, and the market for corporate control is active but not elsewhere.  Econometrically this 
means that there should be a triple interaction of firm age, industry-level variables (investment 
opportunity and M&A activity), and country-level indicators (investor protection, financial 
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development, and market for corporate control). Therefore, our prediction is that in countries 
that have stronger investor protection, more active markets for corporate control, and greater 
financial development, firm age will be more negatively correlated with family ownership in 
industries with greater investment opportunities and with higher M&A activity.
4 
 
2. Data  
We test the life cycle theory of the firm by using two approaches. The first is to study a smaller 
panel of firms that we trace over ten years from 1996 to 2006. The second is to analyze a large 
cross-section of firms in 2006. 
For our first approach, we focus on France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. We 
collect ownership data for December 1996 and ownership changes over the period of 1996 to 
2006. These include hand-collected and carefully cleaned ownership data that accurately trace 
the ownership evolution of all firms over the decade. The choice of these four countries is 
motivated by three considerations: 1) data on private and listed firms from Amadeus is limited to 
European firms; 2) within Europe, these are the four largest economies; and with 3) significant 
differences in investor protection, financial development, and the market for corporate control 
that allow us to test the predictions of the life cycle hypothesis. We collected two separate 
datasets: 1) the TOP 4,000 sample is a selection of the 4,000 largest private or listed companies 
                                                
4 Since the proxies for investment opportunities and M&A activity are correlated with each other at the industry 
level, it is difficult to determine the relative significance of the different channels.  Similarly, at the country level, 
the measures of investor protection, financial development, and activity of market for corporate control are strongly 
correlated: high investor protection is, e.g., associated with both high levels of financial development and active 
markets for corporate control.  Hence, we also employ an aggregate indicator of the three country-level variables. 
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in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom and 2) the LISTED FAMILY sample includes 
all listed family-controlled firms in the four countries and is based on the dataset of Faccio and 
Lang (2002) (henceforth FL 2002). The added value of the LISTED FAMILY dataset is that we 
can identify why firms transition from family control into widely held firms and distinguish 
between those cases in which insiders sell out from those cases in which family control is diluted 
through equity issues.5  
In our second approach, we use cross-sectional data for both private and listed firms with 
sales greater than €50 million for twenty-seven European countries in December 2006. This 
dataset contains 27,652 private and listed firms. We refer to this sample as the ALL FIRM 
sample. In what follows, we describe the three samples and their role in testing our hypotheses. 
We then introduce our country- and industry-level variables.   
 
2.1 TOP 4,000 sample 
We collect data on the largest 1,000 firms in each of the four largest economies in Western 
Europe (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) and use sales as our measure of size. 
We identify this set of companies from Amadeus, a pan-European financial database, as of 
December 1996. We use these 4,000 firms, which include both listed and private companies, to 
study the evolution of ownership over a ten-year period. The novel features of these data are that 
                                                
5 While we observe all control changes for the TOP 4,000 sample, we do not generally observe the process, i.e., how 
the change occurs, as most firms in this sample are private. Private firms are not generally required to release 
information about the number of outstanding shares, insider sales, equity issues, mergers, or acquisitions. Because of 
this we typically cannot distinguish, e.g., whether a family sold its stake to outside investors or whether their 
controlling stake was diluted by equity investments of outsiders.    
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they cover a large number of unlisted firms and allow us to determine their ultimate owner and 
ownership changes over time. 
From Amadeus, we obtain basic financial and ownership information for each of the 
4,000 companies. We then check whether the company survived from 1996 until 2006 and 
record its ownership information in 2006 (if the firm survives). We classify a company’s 
ultimate ownership in seven categories that depend upon if the company was widely held or held 
by a family, the state, another widely held company, several nonfamily shareholders (referred to 
as a “multiple block”), a foreign blockholder, or other shareholder types (referred to as “other”). 
The category “foreign blockholder” is broken down further into foreign family, foreign state, or 
foreign widely held company. “Other shareholder” is a residual category of ultimate owners that 
includes private equity and nonfamily-controlled foundations.  
We define ultimate ownership as control of at least 25% of voting rights, where this stake 
is held directly or via a control chain whose links all exceed the 25% threshold. A widely held 
company is defined as one in which there is no ultimate owner who has a stake greater than 25%. 
We trace controlling stakes through all layers of ownership until we identify the ultimate owner 
and define the ultimate owner’s controlling stake as the minimum voting rights along the control 
chain. We classify ultimate ownership and trace control for all firms in our sample for both 1996 
and 2006. 
The case of Yves Saint Laurent Parfums is a good example of changes of ultimate 
ownership in private firms. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums was originally owned by Yves Saint 
Laurent Groupe SCA, a publicly traded firm established by the French fashion designer Yves 
Saint Laurent, and his business partner, Pierre Bergé, who together were the controlling 
shareholders. In 1993, the founders announced a surprise merger, whereby they would relinquish 
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control and the YSL Groupe would be absorbed, through a share swap, into another publicly 
traded French company, Elf Sanofi SA. Elf Sanofi functioned as the cosmetics and 
pharmaceutical division of Elf Aquitaine, which was publicly traded and controlled by the 
French state. As a result, we record that, in 1996 Yves Saint Laurent Parfums had an ultimate 
controlling owner, i.e., the French State.  
In 1999, Elf Sanofi sold the previously acquired beauty division to Artemis, a private 
holding company owned by French billionaire Francois Pinault. Pinault was, at that time, 
involved in a struggle with Bernard Arnault, another French billionaire, to acquire Gucci Group 
NV, the Italian fashion house. Pinault sold Yves Saint Laurent Parfums to Gucci Group and 
subsequently took control of Gucci after fending off the competing bid by Arnault's LVMH 
group. The acquisition vehicle was Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA, a publicly traded holding 
company, which, in turn, was controlled by Pinault’s private Artemis holding. By 2006, Yves 
Saint Laurent Parfums had changed its name to Groupe YSL Beauté, and it had a new ultimate 
owner, the Pinault family. Therefore, in our sample, in 2006 Yves Saint Laurent Parfums is 
classified as family controlled; and we can record that a change of control from state to family 
has happened sometime between 1996 and 2006. 
We have devoted considerable efforts in order to ensure the accuracy of our data and 
manually trace ultimate owners for all 4,000 firms. To do this, we combine shareholding links 
reported in Amadeus with a large number of alternate sources, including Wer gehoert zu Wem for 
Germany, the London Share Price Data Base for the United Kingdom, Consob for Italy, and 
DAFSA for France. Most firms in the sample, particularly the privately owned ones, present 
complex challenges in data collection. As the example illustrates, tracing ultimate ownership 
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frequently produces a very different category of ownership from that of direct shareholdings. We 
describe how we build this ownership data in detail in the Data Appendix.6  
 
2.2 LISTED FAMILY sample  
Our second sample includes all listed family-controlled companies in France, Germany, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom. This sample is an extension of the TOP 4,000 sample, as it has the 
same panel structure but includes all listed family firms, regardless of whether they are in the 
TOP 4,000. It allows us to perform additional tests that cannot be performed on the TOP 4,000 
sample.7  
First, it allows us to control directly for family characteristics, such as board membership, 
and effects of generational change over time. Sufficient information on these variables is only 
available for listed firms. Second, it also allows us to control for the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, such as dual class shares, pyramids, and wedges, between cash flow and voting 
rights, which are frequently used by families (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002). Data about the use of such 
mechanisms are not available for private firms. Third, because of disclosure requirements, 
corporate events, such as takeovers, mergers, bankruptcies, equity issues, or delistings, are 
                                                
6 The Data Appendix is available on the authors’ webpages. 
7 There is a limited overlap between the family firms in the TOP 4000 sample and the LISTED FAMILY sample. In 
Italy 50% of the family firms in the TOP 4000 are also listed. In France, the overlap is 25%, in Germany 16%, and 
in the United Kingdom only 10%. This suggests that the family listed firms are not representative of all family firms 
in these countries (with the possible exception of Italy): they are rather small, while the largest family firms are 
private. This also suggests that prior studies of family firms, which only consider listed firms, have tended to 
oversample small firms.  
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identifiable for listed but not private companies. Since these events may result in control 
changes, our focus on listed firms allows us to shed light on the precise mechanisms behind the 
evolution of family ownership over time. 
Our starting point for constructing the sample is the FL (2002) data, which provide a 
snapshot of the ultimate ownership of all listed companies in thirteen European countries, taken 
around 1996. From the FL (2002) data we select all firms classified as family controlled in our 
four countries. We subject every firm to the same process to identify the ultimate owner as for 
the TOP 4,000 sample. While each firm in this sample is, by definition, listed, it may be 
controlled by a private firm or a complex mix of private and listed firms. The main 
methodological improvement is that, compared with FL (2002), we have information on the 
ownership of private firms that are involved in the control chain of listed firms, while they do 
not. We find that this difference is significant, as we classify only 827 companies as 
unequivocally family controlled out of a total of 1,359 companies identified as family controlled 
in the original FL (2002) sample. More details on the comparison between the two datasets are 
provided in the Data Appendix. 
 
2.3 ALL FIRM sample 
The ALL FIRM sample is based on the December 2006 issue of Amadeus, which contains firm 
data from forty-one countries. The purpose of this sample is to test whether our results for the 
four countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) carry over to a larger sample of 
countries, with greater variability of country-level characteristics, including investor protection, 
financial development, and markets for corporate control.  
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In the Amadeus database, the median firm is small—during fiscal year 2005, the median 
firm had twenty-five employees and sales of €2.79 million, with data available for 748,003 
firms. Data quality is good for larger firms and generally decreases significantly with firm size; 
the median firm consequently has few data items available.  
In order to obtain a sample for which most basic data are available, we extract only firms 
that meet the following requirements: the firm is active according to the database; sales, assets, 
operating profit, incorporation year, and industry (U.S. SIC code) are reported for the fiscal year 
2005; sales are at least €50 million and assets are at least €25 million; and the firm is 
incorporated in a country covered by Djankov et al. (2008). We exclude firms in Fama-French 
industries with less than ten firms in total (and we check whether this affects our results). This 
leaves 27,684 firms, as our final sample, from twenty-seven countries. 
One caveat of the ALL FIRM sample is that it includes medium-sized but not small-sized 
firms. In unreported regressions, we find that there is no evidence of an evolutionary path in 
small firms from family firm to widely held firm (below €50 million in sales), irrespective of the 
country in question.8 This dataset has two disadvantages compared with the TOP 4,000 and 
LISTED FAMILY samples. First, we rely on algorithms in order to classify firms into ownership 
categories and cannot manually verify the quality of the data, as we could for the other samples, 
because of the large number of observations. Second, it is a cross-section and cannot be extended 
back in time because the data are not available in Amadeus for earlier years. We describe in 
                                                
8 Possible explanations for this are: 1) small firms are less likely to raise external financing and to be subject to the 
market for corporate control; 2) the quality of data is too noisy in smaller companies, particularly with respect to the 
equity ownership; and 3) very small firms are likely to be run by families in all countries because of economies of 
scale. 
 20 
detail within the Data Appendix how Amadeus traces control and how we process these data to 
identify all family-controlled firms. 
 
2.4 Country characteristics 
Our analysis uses several measures of country-specific characteristics, including investor 
protection, financial development, and the market for corporate control. We measure the quality 
of investor protection (InvProtect) by using the anti–self-dealing indicator produced by Djankov 
et al. (2008). As a measure of financial development (FinDevelop), we use the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP in 2006. Finally, the activity level of the market for corporate 
control (TakeoverMkt) is measured by the number of attempted hostile takeovers as a percentage 
of traded companies between 2001 and 2006, which is computed by using SDC Platinum. The 
three measures are positively correlated but only the correlation coefficient between FinDevelop 
and TakeoverMkt (0.78) is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  We also combine 
these three measures into one aggregate indicator (AI), for which we normalize each variable by 
using the sample mean and standard deviation on the basis of twenty-seven country observations. 
AI is the equal-weighted sum of the three standardized indicators and reported for the twenty-
seven countries in our samples in the Table A1 in the Appendix.9  
Higher scores indicate stronger investor protection, greater financial development, and 
more active markets for corporate control. The aggregate AI score ranges from a minimum of -
1.12 (in Ukraine) to a maximum of 2.24 (in the United Kingdom). There are significant 
                                                
9 The twenty-seven countries in our sample include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. 
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differences across countries, where the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Ireland score very 
high, and Ukraine, Hungary, and Austria score very low. France, Germany, and Italy are close to 
the average (0.08, -0.22, and 0.05, respectively).10  
 
2.5 Industry classification 
As discussed in Section 1, we test the cross-sectional predictions of the life cycle hypothesis by 
using three industry-level variables: the average Tobin’s Q in an industry, the dependence on 
external financing, and the industry-level volume of M&A activity. 
We measure these variables for each of the forty-eight Fama-French industries from U.S. 
Compustat and SDC data. Investment opportunity is measured as the median Tobin’s Q in the 
industry and as external dependence; M&A activity is measured by an indicator of industry 
merger waves.  To construct the first two variables, we follow the methodology in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets (book value of assets minus 
book value of equity plus market value of equity) to the book value of assets. External 
dependence is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure that is not financed by retained 
earnings, using newly issued debt and equity. These measures are computed at the firm level by 
                                                
10 Our results do not depend on how we measure these country characteristics. We have experimented with other 
specifications and alternately have measured investor protection—by using the Djankov et al. (2008) anti-director 
rights index; financial development—by using the number of listed firms divided by population per country; and the 
activity of the market for corporate control—by using the percentage of listed companies targeted in a completed 
deal over a decade. We have also constructed sub-indices of investor protection, financial development, and the 
market for corporate control, which are weighted averages of these individual proxies, and we have produced 
corresponding alternative measures of the aggregate indicator AI. All of our results hold with these alternative 
specifications and are qualitatively unchanged. These results are available on request. 
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using U.S. data and aggregated at the forty-eight Fama-French industry level. We use data from 
1987 to 1996 when we analyze ownership in 1996 (as done in the TOP 4,000 sample) and data 
from 1997 to 2006 to analyze ownership in 2006 (as done in the ALL FIRM sample). To build 
our measure of M&A activity for each Fama-French industry, we scale the total number of 
completed acquisitions of listed companies in the United States (from SDC) by the total number 
of listed firms (from CRSP) over the respective decade. We then define a dummy variable that 
equals one for industries that have above-median M&A activity and zero otherwise. This is our 
final measure of M&A activity at the industry level and is akin to a merger wave indicator, as 
developed by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), and 
Harford (2005). As in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and to avoid endogeneity concerns, we use 
U.S. data to construct these measures.11 
 
3. Results for the Evolution of Ownership 
In this section we test the predictions of the life cycle hypothesis for our panel dataset, which 
includes the TOP 4,000 sample and the LISTED FAMILY sample. We first report detailed 
summary statistics on ultimate ownership for the cross-section of firms in each country in 1996 
for the TOP 4,000 sample. Then, we examine firm age, investment opportunities, and M&A 
activity as explanatory variables for family control, and we analyze the evolution of ownership 
                                                
11 We calculate pan-European industry measures of investment opportunities and M&A activity measures for all 
industries across all countries in the ALL FIRM sample, using financial data from Worldscope and M&A data from 
SDC Platinum. The correlation between U.S. and European investment opportunities using the twenty-seven 
countries is 0.80, significant at the 1% level, while the correlation for M&A activity is 0.34 and is significant at the 
5% level. We cannot calculate external dependence for the European countries, as doing so requires items from cash 
flow statements that are available for U.S. firms from Compustat but not generally for non-U.S. firms. 
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over the decade by comparing survival rates as family firms to see what determines the 
continuation of family control in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
We then turn to the analysis of the LISTED FAMILY sample, which includes 827 listed 
family firms and explore, in greater detail, the evolution of ownership in family firms. For the 
LISTED FAMILY sample, we distinguish between takeovers, going private, block sales, and 
insolvencies in order to identify the precise channels through which the evolution of family 
control takes place. We also study how family characteristics, control-enhancing mechanisms, 
equity issues, and acquisitions affect the dynamics of firm ownership over time.  
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 1, we describe ultimate ownership of the largest 1,000 listed and unlisted companies in 
1996 in each country. Panel A reports data on the full sample, which includes the largest 1,000 
firms in each country, except for the few firms for which ultimate ownership cannot be 
identified. There are 923 firms in Germany, 970 in France, 980 in the United Kingdom, and 954 
in Italy. Among these, family ownership is highest in Italy (53.1%) and lowest in the United 
Kingdom (21%). Conversely, the percentage of widely held companies is highest in the United 
Kingdom (27.4%) and lowest in Italy (5.6%). State ownership is significant and about 10% in all 
countries, except the United Kingdom, where it is 2%.12 The fraction of companies that have a 
                                                
12 In the table we do not distinguish between domestic and foreign ownership, but we observe the nationality of all 
blockholders. In the United Kingdom, foreign blockholders control 22.4% of all firms, as compared with domestic 
blockholders, who control only 13.8%. Of the total of 22.4% of foreign ownership, 7.4% are controlled by foreign 
families. Thus, foreign families control about the same proportion of UK firms as domestic families, i.e., 7.3%. For 
the Continental countries the pattern is reversed. Domestic blockholders are much more prevalent than are foreign 
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widely held parent is also significant and varies between 24.4% in Italy and 46% in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
TABLE 1 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
We then compare listed and private firms: 27.8% of UK companies are listed, while the 
proportion of listed companies is much lower in the other three countries: 14.5% in Germany, 
13.6% in France, and 8.4% in Italy. In Panel B and as documented by Barca and Becht (2001), 
we find that listed firms in France, Germany, and Italy are much less likely to be widely held 
than are firms in the United Kingdom. As many as 85% of UK-listed companies are classified as 
widely held, compared with only 22% of German, 21% of French, and 3% of Italian companies. 
The large controlling blocks in countries are, like Italy, held mainly by families, where 66% of 
all listed companies have a family blockholder; the corresponding proportions are 49% in France 
and 34% in Germany. In the United Kingdom, families control only 8% of listed companies. 
In Panel C, we describe the ownership of private firms. Particularly for the United 
Kingdom, we would expect the proportion of family-controlled firms to be much higher among 
private versus listed firms because both mechanisms of diluting family control—the raising of 
external finance and M&A activity—are likely to be less important in private firms. The results 
show that in the United Kingdom the proportion of family (private) firms is 26%, which is much 
lower than in Continental European countries. This number declines to less than 13% if only 
                                                                                                                                                       
blockholders, and foreign families control far fewer firms in the three countries than in the United Kingdom: 2.6% 
of firms in Germany, 4.0% in France, and 2.7% in Italy. 
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domestic families are considered. In Continental Europe the proportion of family firms is 
strikingly similar to those for listed firms: 39% in Germany, 43% in France, and 52% in Italy. 
Finally, a comparison of Panels B and C shows that in moving from listed to private, 
family ownership increases on average from 29.8% to 40.8%, which confirms that family firms 
are generally more likely to be private than listed, but the difference is modest. At the country 
level, however, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the proportion of family firms among 
private firms is close to or—in the case of France and Italy—actually lower than the proportion 
of family-owned firms among listed firms. The explanation is that, while absolute numbers of 
family firms among private firms are high, there are also significant numbers of widely held 
cooperatives (especially in France and Germany), state-owned firms (especially in Germany and 
Italy), firms with multiple blockholders, and firms controlled by nonfamily foundations, which 
depress the relative share of family firms. 
 
3.2 Influence of firm age on family ownership 
As discussed in the hypotheses section, a prediction of the life cycle hypothesis is that as firms 
age, they are less likely to be family controlled in countries that have stronger investor 
protection, greater financial development, and more active markets for corporate control 
(outsider countries). Given the differences along these dimensions between the  United Kingdom 
and the three Continental European countries, we expect firm age to be negatively correlated 
with family ownership in the  United Kingdom but not in Continental Europe.  
Table 2 reports probit regressions on the 1996 cross-section of firms, where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a family controls the 
firm in 1996 and zero otherwise. The regressions control for Fama-French industry fixed effects 
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and country fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects and standard errors are 
calculated by the delta method and clustered by country. We report marginal effects and their 
corresponding standard errors, rather than the estimated coefficients, because, as Powers (2005) 
shows, the interpretation of coefficient estimates of interaction terms and their standard errors 
can be misleading in binary regressions. As our probit regression is nonlinear, the marginal 
effects change with the values of the predictors, and we report the marginal effect for each 
coefficient that is evaluated at the average value of the predictor. The interpretation of the 
reported marginal effects is therefore that they indicate the average predicted change in the 
probability of a firm being family controlled in response to a unit change in one of the predictors 
(e.g., firm age), holding all other predictors constant.13  
 
TABLE 2 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
The results in column 1 show that firm age is a significant determinant of the probability 
of family ownership. We measure firm age by the number of years (in hundreds) since 
incorporation. The results show that there is an important difference between the  United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe. While in the United Kingdom older firms are less likely to be 
family controlled, there is no effect of age in Continental Europe. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the interaction of the age variable with the UK dummy variable is negative and 
significant. To illustrate the economic effect, a ten-year increase in firm age in the United 
Kingdom (standard deviation of firm age is thirty-six) decreases the probability of family control 
                                                
13 Note that the number of observations in Table 2 is lower than the 3,827 firms with known ownership status in 
Table 1 because firm age, sales, or industry classification data are not available for all firms. 
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by 2%. Age on its own is positive but not a significant explanatory variable of the probability of 
family control in Continental Europe.14 
 We now investigate the two channels that can cause family firms to become nonfamily 
controlled by using the 1996 cross-section: investment opportunities and M&A activity. Better 
investment opportunities, keeping everything else fixed, create a need for external financing, 
which, if this takes the form of new equity issues, may dilute family control. The results shown 
in columns 2 and 3 reveal that this happens in the United Kingdom but not in Continental 
Europe. In column 2, the interaction between the UK dummy and our first measure of investment 
opportunities, external dependence, is negative and strongly significant. The result is weaker in 
column 3, where the UK dummy is interacted with our second measure of investment 
opportunities, Tobin’s Q—the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. Since 
ExtDep and Q are industry-level variables and the regressions include industry dummies, we can 
include the interaction of these variables with the UK dummy variable but not with the variables 
themselves.  
If a family firm faces an increase in M&A activity (a merger wave), this activity is likely 
to lead to new equity issues in order to finance acquisitions or to sales of existing shares, which 
both lead to less family control. The results, in column 4, show that in the United Kingdom, 
                                                
14 In unreported tests, we find that UK firms are on average younger, and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
rejects the equality of the distribution of age between the United Kingdom and the other three countries at the 1% 
level. 
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M&A activity is negatively correlated with family control. The coefficient of the interaction 
between the UK dummy and M&A is negative and strongly statistically significant.15  
In summary, we find that investment opportunities and M&A activity are associated with 
dilution of family ownership in the United Kingdom but not in Continental Europe.  In all 
specifications, listed firms are less likely to be family controlled, compared with private ones, 
which suggests that going public leads to a dilution of control in all countries and that smaller 
firms are more likely to be family controlled. This is consistent with the evidence in Helwege, 
Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) and Foley and Greenwood (2010), who show that ownership 
concentration declines following IPOs in U.S. firms and in countries that have stronger investor 
protection, respectively. The result on firm size is consistent with the evidence in Holderness 
(2009), which emphasizes the importance of controlling for firm size in an analysis of ownership 
concentration. 
 
3.3 Survival of family control 
An alternative way to test the life cycle hypothesis is to study the evolution of family control 
over time, which, in our sample, means from 1996 to 2006. In Panel A, Table 3, we show that 
the proportion of companies in our 1996 sample that survived as independent entities in 2006 
was 52% in Germany, 70% in France, 65% in the United Kingdom, and 63% in Italy. Of those 
that survived, 35% in Germany, 49% in France, 41% in the United Kingdom, and 35% in Italy 
remained in the top 1,000.  
                                                
15 In all regressions in Table 2, the coefficient on the interaction of age and the UK dummy is always negative and 
statistically different from zero at a 1% level. Since the probit regressions include industry and country fixed effects, 
this suggests that in the United Kingdom the life cycle channel operates independently of industry characteristics. 
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TABLE 3 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel B reports ownership classification of firms that survive through to 2006 sorted by 
their ownership type in 1996.16 For tractability, we aggregate ownership categories into family 
controlled, widely held, state controlled, other blockholders, and firms controlled by an unknown 
owner. The main conclusion is that, with the exception of family firms in the United Kingdom, 
there is considerable stability of ownership across time in all countries. Stability of control 
means that firms do not switch from one form of control to another over the decade.  
The largest change in family ownership occurs in the United Kingdom. Of all family-
controlled firms in 1996 that survived until 2006, only 50% remain family firms in 2006. Family 
ownership in the Continental European countries by comparison was much more stable than in 
the United Kingdom. By 2006, 75% of German family firms 66% of French family firms, and 
77% of Italian family firms survive as family firms. Family control in Continental Europe 
therefore is, on average, about one-fifth more stable than in the United Kingdom. 
In Table 4, we focus on family firms and study their survival as family firms over the 
period of 1996–2006 in a probit regression. This provides an alternative test of the life cycle 
hypothesis and a robustness check for the purely cross-sectional evidence that is reported in 
                                                
16 Note that, by construction, we can only observe ownership in 2006 for the 62.6% of firms that survive as legal 
entities until 2006. The most likely reason for nonsurvival is acquisition by another firm. We cannot obtain 
systematic evidence on the reasons for nonsurvival of the TOP 4,000 sample, however, as this information is 
unavailable for most private firms. We have this information for the LISTED FAMILY sample. 
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Table 2. In these regressions, the dependent variable is a dummy for survivorship under the same 
ownership over the 1996–2006 decade, and the sample is restricted to family firms.17 
 
TABLE 4 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
We find that the probability of survival as family firms decreases with age in the United 
Kingdom, while it increases in Continental Europe. The relevant coefficient is the interaction 
between the UK dummy and firm age, which in column 1 is negative and significantly different 
from zero. In columns 2 and 3, we show that in the United Kingdom the probability of survival 
as family firms is lower in industries that have higher investment opportunities (measured by 
higher ExtDep and higher Q). We also show in column 4, that the probability of survival is lower 
in sectors that have higher M&A activity in the United Kingdom. In unreported regressions we 
find that when external financing, investment opportunities and M&A activity are included on 
their own (without a UK interaction term) in place of the industry dummies then they have no 
explanatory power. This indicates that the relation of survival probabilities to investment 
opportunities and M&A activity is restricted to the United Kingdom.  
A good example of how family firms in the United Kingdom evolve into widely held 
companies is J Sainsbury plc. The company was family controlled in 1996 and had become 
                                                
17 There are influences, of course, other than ownership changes on the continuity of family ownership.  One such 
factor is bankruptcy. Claessens and Klapper (2005) show that the average annual bankruptcy rate is 2.6% in France, 
1%in Germany, 0.5% in Italy, and 1.9% in the United Kingdom. The fact that bankruptcies are more common in 
France than in the United Kingdom suggests that differences in bankruptcy rates are unlikely to explain our findings. 
As further support for our claim, we later show in the article that for the LISTED FAMILY sample the family 
ownership life cycle is unaffected by exclusion of bankruptcy cases.     
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widely held by 2006 as a result of a reduction of the family stake. The firm was incorporated in 
1922 and listed in 1973 as the largest UK IPO at the time. The founding family controlled over 
30% of voting rights, as well as management, with a descendant of J Sainsbury as CEO from 
incorporation and until 1998 when the last family member (David Sainsbury) retired. After the 
IPO and as the company grew into one of the largest supermarket chains in the United Kingdom, 
the family gradually reduced their stake in the firm. The family currently owns 13.9% of the 
shares but can still, on occasion, exercise control over the company, which they did, e.g., in 
fending off a takeover from KKR in 2006.  
The reasons for why families relinquish control are quite different in Continental Europe 
than in the United Kingdom. External events often appear to lie behind this. Consider, e.g., the 
case of Germany’s Tiptel AG, a small producer of upmarket telephone equipment, which went 
public in 1973 with more than 50% of the votes controlled by the Schaefer family. Tiptel was 
family controlled in 1996 but became widely held by 2006. In the 1990s, the firm attempted but 
failed in the takeover of a German competitor. Afterwards and while it recovered, Tiptel failed to 
develop a strong market position and recorded its last positive earnings in 2001. Sales declined 
from €37 million in 2002 to €30 million in 2005. In the face of these difficulties, the founding 
family reduced its involvement in the company by decreasing their stake from 50% to 11.5% in 
2006. The company later filed for bankruptcy (in March 2007). 
Another example is Italy’s Saffa SpA, a medium-sized chemical company, founded in 
1904 and listed in 1942 on the Milan Stock Exchange. In 1986, it was part of the Bonomi group, 
which started in real estate and expanded into banking and chemicals. By the early 1990s, the 
group was fighting for survival as a result of poor financial decisions, and the Bonomi family 
was forced to sell most of its investments, including Saffa. In 1997, the company was merged 
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into Reno de Medici SpA. (another company operating in the chemical sector), and the family’s 
stake declined from over 50% to less than 20%; subsequently, it was divested in full. This case is 
therefore another example in which the transition from family to widely held firm is the 
consequence of external constraints, rather than a voluntary decision on the part of the 
controlling family.  This may explain why there is less evidence of the evolution of family firms 
being driven by investment opportunities in Continental Europe. 
 
3.4 Listed family firms 
In this section, we use our second LISTED FAMILY sample of companies, which consists of all 
listed family-controlled firms in 1996 in our four countries. The greater level of detail in this 
sample allows us to extend our analysis of the family ownership life cycle in three significant 
ways. First, we can now analyze how the life cycle depends on whether the controlling family 
directly descends from the firm’s founder (founding family) or has acquired the business from 
the founding family (nonfounding family). Second, we can evaluate whether the life cycle 
depends on the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual class shares, pyramids, and 
wedges, between cash flow and voting rights. Data on such mechanisms are not available for 
private firms. Third, we can establish not only if but also how families lose control over time. In 
our previous TOP 4,000 analysis, we identify all control changes over time, but we do not know 
why a family firm does not survive—whether it was through takeover, going private, dilution of 
control, or insolvency. For the LISTED FAMILY sample, we can explore these channels and, in 
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particular, in the case of family firms, we can identify if dilution of ownership occurs through 
primary equity issues or secondary equity sales.18  
We begin by providing descriptive statistics about family characteristics and their use of 
control-enhancing mechanisms in Panel A, Table 5. Descendants of the firm’s founder control 
almost 70% of the 827 listed firms in the sample in 1996. The differences across countries 
suggest that families (or their firms) are active as acquirers of other family companies in 
Germany (and in the rest of Continental Europe) but much less so in the United Kingdom. As an 
example, in July 2008, Schaeffler Group, a private company owned by the German Schaeffler 
family, acquired a majority stake in Continental AG, a large German tire manufacturer that was 
previously widely held, for about €12 billion. Such a transaction by a family-controlled firm 
would be almost inconceivable in the United Kingdom.  In the United Kingdom, family firms are 
more often run by the founder than in France and Germany: t-tests of equality of means between 
the United Kingdom and Continental Europe (Table 5 reports p-values) show that Continental 
European firms are less likely to have a family CEO, family stakes are held more often by 
several family members, more control is exercised via pyramids, and there are lower cash-flow 
to voting rights ratios and higher family voting stakes in 1996. 
 
TABLE 5 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                
18 Our analysis contributes to the literature on family succession. Previous results show that value is destroyed in the 
passing of active management from the founder to his or her descendants (Morck and Yeung 2003; Pérez-González 
2006; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Bertrand et al. 2008) and 
that country-specific legal institutions, like inheritance laws and norms, influence the likelihood of succession (Ellul, 
Pagano, and Panunzi 2008). 
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We find that listed family firms are younger in the United Kingdom than in Continental 
Europe, which suggests that firms in Continental Europe go public later. However, differences in 
the decision to go public do not explain the entire variability across countries in family control. 
For instance, in Table 1, we find that family control is less common in the United Kingdom in 
both listed and private firms. 
In Panel B, we consider control changes from 1996 to 2006. In 2006, a firm may still be 
in family control or may have been taken private by the controlling family. We classify these two 
outcomes together as “no change of control”. Alternatively, the firm may have become widely 
held, insolvent, or may have been acquired. We classify these three outcomes together as a 
“change of control”. We find that almost half of our companies have undergone a change of 
control, but there are substantial differences across countries: 68% in the United Kingdom 
compared with only 26% in Italy, 44% in Germany, and 39% in France. The differences confirm 
our life cycle results. Family firms in the United Kingdom are significantly more likely to 
experience a change of control than are their Continental European counterparts. The most 
common reason for family firms to change their form of ownership is a takeover. The second 
most common reason is for family firms to become widely held without a takeover: this happens 
in 30% of control changes in the United Kingdom but only about 10% of control changes in the 
other three countries.  
What are the causes of the control changes in the latter cases? Do families lose control 
because of primary equity issues or because of secondary equity sold? Panel C breaks down 
secondary equity sales into open market purchases and negotiated sales of a block. The evidence 
shows that primary issues are the single most important channel and are responsible for about 
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half of the shifts from family control to widely held corporations; secondary sales in the form of 
block trades and open market sales explain the remaining cases. 
In Panel D, we classify the ownership structure of the acquirer for each of the 257 firms 
that were taken over. Families are the most common acquirers across all four countries, followed 
by widely held firms, while a small percentage of firms are acquired by firms with other 
ownership types, like private equity investors, multiple blockholders, financial institutions, and 
state-owned companies. Interestingly, we do not find any statistical difference between UK and 
Continental European firms in this regard. While acquisitions therefore account for a high 
proportion of control changes in the United Kingdom, the move towards dispersed ownership 
does not result from a high incidence of dispersed ownership among acquiring firms. Many of 
the acquirers are foreign firms and foreign families, which suggests an integrated market for 
corporate control across the four countries. 
In Panel E, we compare the financial performance of family firms across countries. For 
this comparison, we match our sample with financial data from Worldscope and with data about 
acquisitions from SDC Platinum. We calculate average profitability (return on assets (ROA)), 
sales, sales and asset growth, capital expenditures, leverage, and net equity issues from 
Worldscope data for all available years in the 1996-2006 period. We also construct two measures 
of acquisitions by the firms in the sample: No. of acquisitions is the number of private or listed 
companies acquired by the firm and Percentage of stock-financed acquisitions is the number of 
acquisitions financed with at least 50% of stock, value-weighted by deal size.  
UK family firms are much smaller, significantly more profitable (ROA), grow faster, and 
are less highly levered than are Continental European companies. For acquisitions, the univariate 
comparison shows that, while numbers of acquisitions are similar across countries, UK firms 
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issue significantly more equity and finance a larger number of their acquisitions with equity 
issues. The evidence in Panel D therefore confirms that country differences in dilution over time 
are related to new equity issues. 
We now turn to a multivariate analysis of control changes in family firms. In Table 6, the 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether or not a change of control happened during the 
1996–2006 period for firms that are family controlled and listed in 1996. In column 1, we find 
that the probability of a change of control after the first generation is significantly higher in the 
United Kingdom than it is in Continental Europe. The coefficient for the interaction term 
between the UK dummy and a dummy variable for firms in control of the second generation or 
higher is positive and significant. As in the TOP 4,000 sample, in column 2, we find that the 
probability of a change of control for family firms significantly increases with firm age in the 
United Kingdom but not in Continental Europe. To illustrate the economic effect, a ten-year 
increase in firm age in the United Kingdom increases the probability of a control change by four 
percentage points. Furthermore, changes of control are more likely if the family owns a small 
equity stake or if the controlling stake is divided between more family members. Founding 
family ownership matters, and we find that firms still controlled by the descendants of the 
founder in 1996 have a significantly lower probability of experiencing a subsequent change of 
control. 
 
TABLE 6 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
We also find that if the family stake is divided between at least two family members, 
there is a higher likelihood of a control transfer over the following decade. This may be an 
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indication that dispersion of blocks among family members may lead to conflicts within the 
family over control and ultimately to a sale of the business itself. For instance, one family 
member may extract private benefits of control at the cost of the other family members and the 
minority shareholders. This is consistent with Bertrand et al.’s (2008) findings for Thai business 
groups, where dividing the family business among more descendants leads to lower subsequent 
performance. 
Importantly, our result—that the life cycle hypothesis applies in the United Kingdom but 
not in Continental Europe—is robust to the inclusion of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as 
pyramids and wedges, between voting and cash-flow rights of the controlling family. Although 
pyramids and control wedges are used significantly more often in Continental Europe than in the 
United Kingdom, they do not, on their own, reduce the probability of a change of control from 
family to nonfamily in our sample.  
Finally, we provide additional evidence on the precise mechanisms for the transition from 
family- to nonfamily-controlled firms in columns 3 and 4. As we have previously shown, both 
investment opportunities and M&A activity reduce the likelihood of family control. If M&A 
activity causes the loss of control, control changes could be related to situation in which the 
family makes equity-financed acquisitions. If investment opportunities cause the loss of control, 
control changes should be related to new equity issues in order to finance growth. We first focus 
on acquisitions in column 3, where we include acquisitions and their interaction with a UK 
dummy variable. The results confirm that acquisitions are related to control changes in the 
United Kingdom but not in Continental Europe. The interaction of the UK dummy with 
acquisitions is positive and significant. Acquisitions therefore do not appear to lead to loss of 
control in Continental Europe because they are rarely equity-financed. 
 38 
Column 4 focuses on new equity issues in order to finance growth, where we include net 
equity issues as an explanatory variable. Again, we include an interaction term with a UK 
dummy variable. Since construction of the financial variables requires Worldscope coverage, the 
sample size drops to 630 observations. The results show that high primary equity issues are 
positively correlated with changes in control; therefore, they lower the likelihood of family 
control over time in the United Kingdom but not in Continental Europe.19 
Overall, the results suggest that the life cycle differences between UK and Continental 
European family firms are primarily due to the larger use of primary equity issues (to finance 
acquisitions and other investments) by families in the United Kingdom. This is consistent with 
Foley and Greenwood’s (2010) findings that in IPO firms reductions in shareholder 
concentration over time in strong investor protection countries are driven primarily by new 
equity issues, rather than secondary equity sales. 
 
4. Cross-Sectional Evidence from Twenty-Seven Countries 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results on a much larger number of countries by 
using the ownership structure of private and listed firms in the purely cross-sectional ALL FIRM 
dataset. First, we examine firm age as the determinant of family control. Second, we assess the 
explanatory power of investment opportunities and M&A activity as determinants of family 
control. 
                                                
19 We re-run the regressions in columns (1) and (2) and exclude all sixty cases of default. This is a robustness check 
to determine whether the life cycle results may be influenced by country-specific differences in default rates of 
family firms. The (unreported) results show that this is not the case, as the interaction of the UK dummy with both 
>=2
nd
 generation and FirmAge remains positive and significant at the 1% level. 
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Table A2 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for each country in 2006. The 
median sample firm is private, eighteen years old, has €122 million sales, has €83 million assets, 
and has 370 employees. The largest number of firms are from the United Kingdom (7,604), 
France (4,801), Italy (2,716), and Germany (2,189). The smallest number of firms are from 
Luxembourg (7), Latvia (13), Bulgaria (14), and Lithuania (16). Countries with the largest 
proportion of family firms are Lithuania (62.5%), Croatia (39.1%), and Greece (33.5%).  
Table 7 replicates the analysis performed in Table 2 for the TOP 4,000 sample. It reports 
probit regressions in which the dependent variable is the family control dummy variable, which 
controls for country and Fama-French industry fixed effects. Since ownership information is for 
2006 (in this sample), we compute external dependence, Tobin’s Q, and M&A activity by using 
data from the period of 1997–2006 (rather than the period of 1987–1996 that is used in the TOP 
4,000 sample). 
 
TABLE 7 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
In column 1, we show that the coefficient on the product of (Firm age) x (InvProtect) is 
negative and statistically significant. We find a similar result when Firm age is interacted with 
FinDevelop in column 5, with TakeoverMkt in column 9, and the aggregate indicator AI in 
column 13. The effect is economically significant. An increase in firm age by twenty-seven years 
(which is one standard deviation) in a country, such as the United Kingdom (which has an AI 
score of 2.24) is associated with a 3% larger decline in the probability of family ownership than 
the same increase in firm age in Ukraine (which has an AI score of -1.12).  
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In columns 2, 6, 10, and 14, we keep the firm age interaction term and additionally test if 
family firms are more likely to survive in industries that have lower dependence on external 
finance. Since external dependence is an industry-level variable and the regression includes 
industry fixed effects, we include the interaction of external dependence with the four outsider 
indicators. As in Table 3, we again find a negative correlation between external dependence 
(ExtDep) and family ownership in outsider countries. The negative coefficient on the interaction 
of the four country-level indicators and ExtDep shows that family firms are less common in 
industries that are more dependent on external capital in countries with stronger investor 
protection, higher financial development, and more active markets for corporate control.  
In columns 3, 7, 11, and 15, we test if family firms are more likely to survive in industries 
that have less M&A activity. As before, we find a negative correlation between M&A activity 
(M&A Act) and family ownership in countries that have higher investor protection (greater 
financial development, more active markets for corporate control). In columns 4, 8, 12, and 16, 
we test whether family firms are more likely to survive in industries that have lower investment 
opportunities. As before, we find a negative correlation between investment opportunities (Q) 
and family ownership in countries that have high scores for investor protection, financial 
development, and corporate control markets.20 
As a test of whether the life cycle might be influenced by inheritance taxes, we consider 
the interaction of firm age and an inheritance tax variable that we construct from the maximum 
                                                
20 We re-run all regressions in Table 7 without industry fixed effects and add external dependence, Q and M&A 
activity, as industry-level variables, while keeping the interaction terms. The results (not reported) show that all 
three industry-level variables have negative coefficients and are significant at the 1% level or better, while 
coefficients of the interactions are unchanged. 
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payable inheritance tax in all twenty-seven countries of the study.21 The coefficient of the 
interaction between firm age and inheritance tax is always negative but never significant, which 
suggests that inheritance taxes do not influence the life cycle of family ownership.  
Overall, the results in Table 7 indicate that firms that are older and operate in sectors that 
have better investment opportunities and more M&A activity are less likely to be family 
controlled in countries that have stronger investor protection, higher financial development, and 
more active markets for corporate control.  
Finally, we consider the triple interaction of firm age, industry-level investment 
opportunities (M&A activity), and country-level investor protection (financial development and 
market for corporate control), which is a test of the evolution of family firms over time and 
across industries. In industries with lower investment opportunities or lower M&A activity, firm 
age should be more negatively correlated with family ownership if investor protection is strong 
(financial markets are developed and the market for corporate control is active). 
In Table 8, we add this triple interaction between firm age, one of the industry-level 
variables, and one of the country-level variables. For instance, in column 1, we take the 
specification estimated in column 2, Table 7 and add the interaction between Investor protection, 
Firm age, and M&A activity. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative and 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level. Hence, firms are less likely to stay family 
                                                
21 Tsoutsoura (2009), e.g., shows that inheritance tax in Greece is associated with less family firm investment. We 
collect tax rates from Deloitte’s International Tax and Business Guides and assign a 0% rate for countries in which 
there is no inheritance tax or in which inheritance from parent to child is tax-exempt (Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine). Inheritance tax rates have a mean 
of 15.7% and standard deviation of 18%. Inheritance tax rates are positively correlated with the AI index, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.39, and are significant at the 5% level. 
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controlled as they age in countries that have stronger investor protection and in industries that 
have higher M&A activity. We estimate the same specifications for all combinations of country-
level indicators and industry characteristics. In all cases, we find that the coefficient on the triple 
interaction is negative and statistically significant. Hence, we find strong support for the 
hypothesis that investment opportunities and M&A activity are the channels through which 
family ownership evolves over time in high investor protection systems.22 
 
TABLE 8 SHOULD GO ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Conclusion 
The striking conclusion to emerge from this article is that, while the life cycle theory is one of 
the most widely cited “stylized facts” about firms, it receives little empirical support from 
international evidence. It applies in some countries but not in most.  Basically, family firms 
evolve into widely held companies as they age only in countries that have strong investor 
protection, well-developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control. In 
                                                
22 As an additional robustness check, we re-run all regressions in Table 8 but weighting all countries equally, i.e., we 
weight each firm observation by the inverse of the number of firms in that country. This allows us to address the 
question of whether the larger countries in the sample influence our results. Reweighting, however, also increases 
noise if the number of firms in a country is inversely related to the quality of the coverage by Amadeus, which is 
likely to be the case. To decrease noise, we drop from this analysis seven countries with less than a hundred firms in 
total. Even when equally weighting all countries, we find that all the interaction coefficients shown in Table 8 keep 
their negative sign and confirm the previous life cycle results of family ownership. Out of the twelve coefficients, 
eight interactions remain significant at the 1% level or better, the (AI) x (FirmAge) x (M&A) interaction remains 
significant at the 5% level, and the three interactions with investor protection become insignificant. 
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countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets 
for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. This is true of both private and 
public firms. In countries that have strong investor protection, well-developed financial markets, 
and active markets for corporate control, family control is concentrated in industries in which 
low investment opportunities, low M&A activity, and new equity issues are a primary source of 
dilution of family ownership. This is not so in countries that have low investor protection, where 
family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A. 
The emergence of these insights reflects three features of our analysis. First, we use data 
on private, as well as listed, companies. Since private firms account for more than 80% of the top 
1,000 companies in France, Germany, and Italy, their exclusion from previous analyses has been 
a serious omission. Second, we trace ownership through its intermediate layers to its ultimate 
source, even in cases in which it is held via private firms. The previous attribution of ownership 
in these cases to concentrated family holdings has been found to be frequently incorrect. Third, 
and perhaps most significant, we supplement cross-section analyses of the nature of ownership at 
a particular point in time in a large number of countries with more detailed panels that allow us 
to trace evolution of control over time.  
The article does not address the welfare or efficiency properties associated with the 
different patterns of evolution. Whether strong investor protection, well-developed financial 
systems, and active markets in corporate control are beneficial in providing families with 
portfolio diversification and financing opportunities that do not exist elsewhere or whether 
dilution of control is imposed on them in the absence of alternative financing or control 
arrangements remains an open question. The coexistence of different institutional arrangements 
points to possible multiple equilibria sustained by a complementarity between financial 
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institutions and corporate ownership. In some economies, family businesses may be so 
influential that they are able to shape institutions and overcome financial constraints without 
giving up control. In those economies, bank finance and control vehicles may emerge to promote 
the continuation of family ownership, whereas, in other economies in which family businesses 
are less influential, liquid markets in equity financing and control develop instead and encourage 
the dispersion of ownership and control. These differences in ownership may, in turn, be 
associated with different types of productive activities, rather than the economic dominance of 
one form over another. 
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Table 1  
Ultimate control of listed versus private firms  
This table reports statistics for the largest 1,000 firms by sales in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 
1996 (the TOP 4,000 sample). Panel A reports all firms with available ownership data. Panels B and C describe the 
ownership structure of listed firms and private firms, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Ownership status of largest 1,000 firms 








Multiple blocks 4.4 2.0 0.3 2.0 2.1 
Family 38.6 43.8 21.0 53.1 39.0 
Other 2.1 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.6 
State 13.5 10.1 2.0 12.7 9.5 
Widely held  9.9 8.9 27.4 5.6 13.0 
Widely held parent  31.5 32.1 46.4 24.4 33.7 
Total number of firms with ownership 
data 923 970 980 954 3,827 
Unclassified firms 77 30 20 46 173 
Panel B: Listed firms 
Ownership types (%) Germany France UK Italy 
 
Total 
Multiple blocks 4.5 0.8 0.4 3.8 1.8 
Family 34.3 48.5 7.7 66.3 29.8 
Other 1.5 8.3 1.5 0.0 2.8 
State 12.7 8.3 0.4 18.8 7.1 
Widely held  21.6 20.5 85.3 2.5 46.9 
Widely held parent  25.4 13.6 4.8 8.7 11.7 
Total number of firms 134 132 272 80 618 
Panel C: Private firms 
Ownership types (%) Germany France UK Italy 
 
Total 
Multiple blocks 4.4 2.1 0.3 1.8 2.2 
Family 39.3 43.1 26.1 51.9 40.8 
Other 2.2 2.4 3.2 2.4 2.5 
State 13.7 10.4 2.7 12.1 10.0 
Widely held  7.9 7.0 5.2 5.8 6.5 
Widely held parent  32.6 35.0 62.4 25.9 38.0 




Table 2  
Testing the life cycle hypothesis 
This table reports probit regression results. The dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) a firm is ultimately 
family controlled. It uses the TOP 4,000 sample, i.e., the largest 1,000 private and listed firms by sales in France, 
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 1996. Firms in Fama-French industries with less than ten firms are 
excluded. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects. FirmAge is measured in hundreds of years. ExtDep is 
industry-level external financial dependence, following Rajan and Zingales (1998). M&A is industry-level merger 
activity and equals one if the number of successful takeovers (from SDC) scaled by number of listed firms (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ from CRSP) in a Fama-French industry is above the sample median and is zero otherwise. Q 
is the industry-level market-to-book ratio. ExtDep, M&A, and Q are based on all U.S. Compustat firms (1987–1996). 
Foreign control indicates a firm that is ultimately controlled by a foreign owner. All regressions include industry and 
country fixed effects, with Germany as the base case. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated 
by delta method and clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate a coefficient significantly different from zero at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.  
Dependent variable Firm is family controlled (1) or not (0) 
Sample All firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interaction variable FirmAge ExtDep Q  M&A 
FirmAge 0.055 0.059 0.059 0.057 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
(UK) x (FirmAge) -0.254*** -0.268*** -0.267*** -0.273*** 
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
(UK) x (ExtDep)  -0.040*   
  (0.022)   
(UK) x (Q)   -0.112  
   (0.128)  
(UK) x (M&A)    -0.129*** 
    (0.028) 
Listed firm -0.106* -0.118** -0.118** -0.116** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Foreign control -0.19 -0.195 -0.194 -0.198 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) 
Log (sales) -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,732 3,371 3,387 3,384 
Pseudo R
2
 0.142 0.140 0.145 0.142 
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Table 3  
Firm survival and transition of ultimate ownership  
This table reports survival and ownership transition statistics for the largest 1,000 firms by sales in France, 
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 1996 (the TOP 4,000 sample). Firms with unknown ownership in 1996 
are excluded; therefore, the number of firms per country is lower than 1,000. Panel A reports survival rates of firms 
as of 2006. Panel B reports the numbers of disappearing and surviving firms by ownership type as well as ultimate 
ownership changes.     
Panel A: Survival of the firm 
  Germany  France  UK  Italy  Total 
          
Number of firms in the TOP 1,000 in 1996  923  970  980  954  3,827 
Survival as entity: 
Firm is among TOP 1,000 in 1996 and still exists as 
an entity in 2006 (%) 52.3  70.2  64.6  62.8  62.6 
Survival at the TOP: 
Firm is among TOP 1,000 in 1996 and still exists as 
an entity among the TOP 1,000 in 2006 (%) 34.7  48.6  40.8  35.4  40.0 
          
Panel B: Ownership transition 
  Number of 







If survived: Owner type in 2006 
  Family (%) Widely held 
(%) 
State (%) Mult. blocks, 
widely held 





Firms controlled by family in 1996 
Germany 356 182 68 9 0 14 9 
France 425 285 65 7 2 26 0 
UK 206 138 50 8 1 41 0 
Italy 507 335 72 5 2 15 6 
Firms widely held in 1996 
Germany 91 56 9 52 2 34 4 
France 86 72 10 71 0 15 4 
UK 269 172 6 62 1 31 0 
Italy 53 37 14 78 0 5 3 
Firms controlled by state in 1996 
Germany 125 78 9 9 50 29 3 
France 98 80 14 5 51 28 3 
UK 20 14 21 0 50 29 0 
Italy 121 67 27 6 61 1 4 
Firms controlled by multiple blocks, widely held parent, or other blockholders in 1996 
Germany 351 168 17 3 3 74 3 
France 361 242 20 3 3 73 1 
UK 485 310 17 2 2 79 0 




Table 4  
Survival of family control 
This table reports probit regression results. The dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) a family firm survives 
over the decade of 1996–2006 as a family-controlled firm. It uses the TOP 4,000 sample, i.e., the largest 1,000 
private and listed firms by sales in the France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 1996. Firms in Fama-
French industries with less than ten firms are excluded. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects. All variables 
are as defined in Table 2. All regressions include industry and country fixed effects, with Germany as the base case. 
Robust standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated by delta method and clustered by country. *, **, and 
*** indicate a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.  
Dependent variable Firm survives the decade (1) or not (0) 
Sample Family firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interaction variable FirmAge ExtDep Q  M&A 
FirmAge 0.107*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
(UK) x (FirmAge) -0.158*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.147*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) 
(UK) x (ExtDep)  -0.150***   
  (0.006)   
(UK) x (Q)   -0.453***  
   (0.074)  
(UK) x (M&A)    -0.156*** 
    (0.022) 
Listed firm 0.109 0.106 0.110 0.097 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.082) 
Foreign control -0.021 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Log (sales) 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,359 1,280 1,280 1,289 
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.066 0.066 0.066 
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Table 5  
Listed family-controlled firms  
This table is based on the population of 827 listed family-controlled firms in France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom in December 1996, i.e., the LISTED FAMILY sample. In Panel A, summary statistics are country averages, 
unless otherwise noted. FirmAge is measured in years. Panel B reports if and how the status of the firm changed 
from being a listed family-controlled firm in 1996 over the decade. “No change (N)” indicates the firm is still a 
listed firm controlled by the same family as in 1996. “Went private” indicates the firm delisted. “Widely held in 
2006 (A)” indicates the family no longer holds a controlling stake in 2006, but the firm was not subject to a 
takeover. “Takeover (B)” indicates the firm was subject to a takeover. “Default (C)” indicates the firm went into 
liquidation. “Unknown status” indicates that the firm’s ultimate owner in 2006 or the exact reasons for its 
disappearance over the decade are unknown. Panel C provides a decomposition of all firms that become widely held. 
Panel D provides a classification of the ownership of the acquirer for all firms that are taken over. Panel E reports 
financial data and transactions from 1996 to 2006 (or last listed year if earlier). ROA, sales, sales growth, asset 
growth, capital expenditures, leverage, and net equity issues use Worldscope data and are first averaged per firm and 
then per country. No. of acquisitions is number of private or listed companies acquired by the firm from SDC 
Platinum. Percentage of stock-financed acquisitions is the number of at least 50% stock-financed acquisitions scaled 
by all acquisitions for which acquisition currency is reported in SDC and is value-weighted by deal size. 
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Panel A: Summary statistics for listed family firms in 1996 
 Germany France Italy UK Total 
UK vs. Non-UK 
(p-value) 
Founding family still in control (%) 49.0 72.3 60.4 91.2 69.7 .000 
CEO is a family member (%) 59.0 80.8 74.5 81.1 74.1 .001 
Control divided within family (%) 63.4 81.0 61.3 47.0 58.5 .000 
Dual class shares (%) 23.7 0.8 43.4 16.6 17.4 .710 
Controlled via pyramids (%) 15.8 13.1 22.6 2.3 12.3 .000 
2nd or higher generation in control (%) 84.2 55.4 42.5 43.8 59.5 .000 
Ratio of cash flow to voting rights (%) 88.2 98.1 73.6 96.1 91.4 .000 
Voting rights (%) 68.1 62.1 58.7 41.8 57.9 .000 
FirmAge (yrs.) 91.5 71.7 48.6 38.6 66.2 .000 
Panel B: Evolution of ownership from 1996 to 2006 
No change (N) 109 119 56 54 338  
Went private 18 34 22 16 90  
Widely held in 2006 (A) 9 10 3 44 66  
Takeover (B) 75 82 16 84 257  
Default (C) 26 6 9 19 60  
Unknown status 18 0 0 0 18  
Total 253 251 106 217 827  
Frequency control changes (A + B + C) (%) 43.5 39.0 26.4 67.7 46.3 .000 
Panel C: Decomposition of family firms which become widely held 
Loss of control via (%)       
     Primary equity issue 22.2 60.0 100.0 52.3 52.0 .863 
     secondary open market sale  66.6 30.0 0.0 27.3 31.8 .269 
     secondary negotiated block sale 11.1 10.0 0.0 20.5 16.7 .249 
  Total number (A) 9 10 3 44 66  
Panel D: Decomposition of acquirers of family firms that are taken over 
Family (%) 44.0 63.4 62.5 46.4 52.1 .203 
Widely held firm (%) 28.0 29.3 37.5 34.5 31.1 .414 
Other (%) 28.0 7.3 0.0 19.1 16.8 .490 
   Total number (B) 75 82 16 84 257  
Panel E: Firm financials 1996–2006 
ROA (%) 1.7 4.9 2.6 5.9 3.8 .000 
Sales (US$ billion) 1.1 1.2 1.5 0.4 1.0 .000 
Sales growth (%) 7.5 10.4 9.2 12.4 9.7 .006 
Asset growth (%) 6.9 9.3 8.3 14.2 9.6 .000 
Capex/assets (%) 7.2 6.0 4.7 6.6 6.4 .198 
Leverage (%) 24.9 22.5 25.9 17.1 22.4 .000 
Net equity issues/sales (%) 1.2 1.9 2.8 4.3 2.6 .000 
No. of acquisitions 2.3 2.7 2.0 2.4 2.4 .946 
Percentage of stock-financed acquisitions 3.5 4.2 3.5 10.7 6.7 .000 
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Table 6  
Ownership changes in listed family firms 
The table reports probit regression results for the LISTED FAMILY sample, i.e., all listed firms in 1996 in France, 
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom that in 1996 were family controlled. The dependent variable is whether (1) 
or not (0) the firm experiences a change of control during the period 1996 to 2006. A change of control is defined as 
a case in which a family-controlled firm in 1996 is widely held in 2006 or was taken over or defaulted between 1996 
and 2006. High equity issues is a dummy for whether (1) or not (0) equity issues during 1996–2006 are above the 
sample median. Control wedge is a dummy for whether (1) or not (0) the family’s voting rights differ from its cash 
flow rights. All other variables are from Table 5. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated by 
delta method and clustered by country.*, **, and *** indicate a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
Dependent variable:  Change of control from 1996 to 2006 
Sample: All firms Age known All firms Worldscope 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pyramids -0.038 0.014 -0.040 -0.051* 
 (0.029) (0.057) (0.028) (0.029) 
Control wedge -0.02 -0.014 -0.022 -0.023 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.031) 
Founding family in control in 1996 -0.298*** -0.342*** -0.297*** -0.318*** 
 (0.073) (0.087) (0.071) (0.076) 
Control divided within family 0.079** 0.064 0.080** 0.117*** 
 (0.035) (0.063) (0.036) (0.032) 
Voting rights (%) -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO is family member 0.001 -0.038 0.001 0.013 
 (0.074) (0.087) (0.072) (0.071) 
>=2nd generation -0.002  -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.046)  (0.044) (0.039) 
(UK) x (>=2nd generation) 0.125***  0.140*** 0.097*** 
 (0.045)  (0.043) (0.026) 
FirmAge  -0.001**   
  (0.001)   
(UK) x (FirmAge)  0.004***   
  (0.002)   
No. of acquisitions   -0.001  
   (0.001)  
(UK) x (No. of acquisitions)   0.021***  
   (0.001)  
High equity issues    -0.049 
    (0.041) 
(UK) x (High equity issues)    0.101** 
    (0.043) 
Industry and country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 741 443 741 630 






Table 7  
Testing the life cycle hypothesis in twenty-seven countries 
This table reports results for the ALL FIRM sample of private and listed firms described in the Data Appendix. It reports probit regressions. The 
dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) a firm is family controlled. Regressions include double interaction terms of country-level variables 
(InvProtect, FinDevelop, TakeoverMkt, and AI) with firm-level (FirmAge) and industry-level variables (M&A, ExtDep, and Q). InvProtect is the 
anti–self-dealing indicator by Djankov et al. (2008). FinDevelop is the ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP in 2006. TakeoverMkt is 
the number of attempted hostile takeovers as a percentage of traded companies between 2001 and 2006. InvProtect, FinDevelop, and 
TakeoverMkt are standardized to be standard normal and AI is the equal-weighted average of the three measures. ExtDep, M&A, and Q are as 
defined in Table 4 and calculated for U.S. data (1997–2006). All regressions include control variables (FirmAge, Size, and Listed) and country 
and industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects. Robust standard errors of marginal effects are calculated by delta method 
and clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, 
respectively. The number of observations is 27,684. 











            
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]             
               ... x (ExtDep)  -
0.005*** 
              
  [0.002]               
              … x (M&A)   -0.008**              
   [0.004]              
              … x (Q)    -
0.058*** 
            
    [0.007]             
(FinDevelop) x 
(FirmAge) 
    -
0.037* 
-0.035* -0.036* -0.038*         
     [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]         
                   ... x 
(ExtDep) 
     -
0.010*** 
          
      [0.004]           
                  … x (M&A)       -
0.016*** 
         
       [0.006]          
                  … x (Q)        -
0.088*** 
        
        [0.027]         
(TakeoverMkt) x 
(FirmAge) 








    
         [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014]     
                      ... x 
(ExtDep) 
         -0.004       
          [0.003]       
                     … x 
(M&A) 
          -0.011*      
           [0.006]      
                     … x (Q)            -
0.070*** 
    
            [0.013]     








             [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
                    … x 
(ExtDep) 
             -
0.007*** 
  
              [0.002]   
                    … x 
(M&A) 
              -0.012**  
               [0.005]  
                    … x (Q)                -
0.077*** 
                [0.010] 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.102 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.104 
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Table 8  
Firm age, external financing, M&A activity, and investment opportunities 
This table reports results for the ALL FIRM sample of private and listed firms described in the Data Appendix. It reports probit 
regressions. The dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) a firm is family controlled. Regressions include triple interactions of 
country-level variables (InvProtect, FinDevelop, TakeoverMkt, and AI) and industry-level variables (M&A, ExtDep, and Q) with 
the firm-level Age variable, as well as all double interactions.  All regressions include control variables (FirmAge, Size, and 
Listed) and country and industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects. Robust standard errors of the 
marginal effects are calculated by delta method and clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate a coefficient significantly 
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. The number of observations is 27,684. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(InvProtect)x(FirmAge)x(M&A) -0.020***            
 [0.004]            
               …x(FirmAge)x(ExtDep)  -0.018**           
  [0.008]           
              … x(FirmAge)x(Q)   -0.072**          
   [0.033]          
(FinDevelop)x(Age)x(M&A)    -0.051***         
    [0.013]         
                  …x(FirmAge)x(ExtDep)     -0.040***        
     [0.008]        
                  …x(FirmAge)x(Q)      -0.169**      
      [0.066]       
(TakeoverMkt)x(FirmAge)x(M&A)       -0.045***      
       [0.015]      
                  …x(FirmAge)x(ExtDep)        -0.032***     
        [0.009]     
                  …x(FirmAge)x(Q)         -0.130**    
         [0.057]    
(AI)x(FirmAge)x(M&A)          -0.037***   
          [0.012]   
                  …x(FirmAge)x(ExtDep)           -0.031**  
           [0.014]  
                 …x(FirmAge)x(Q)            -0.124* 
            [0.066] 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.103 0.104 
             

















Table A1  
Country characteristics 
The table reports the country-level variables used in Tables 7 and 8. Data are reported for all countries that are 
covered by Amadeus in December 2006 and by Djankov et al. (2008). InvProtect is the anti–self-dealing indicator in 
Djankov et al. (2008). FinDevelop is the ratio of the stock market capitalization to GDP for 2006. TakeoverMkt is 
the number of attempted hostile takeovers as a percentage of traded companies between 2001 and 2006, based on 
SDC Platinum. We normalize each variable by using the sample mean and standard deviation on the basis of twenty-
seven country observations. AI is the equal-weighted sum of the three standardized indicators.  
Country   InvProtect FinDevelop TakeoverMkt AI 







Austria  0.21 16.4 0.0 -0.82 
Belgium  0.54 67.2 2.5 0.76 
Bulgaria  0.65 5.5 0.0 -0.10 
Croatia  0.25 16.5 1.6 -0.32 
Czech Republic  0.33 20.2 0.0 -0.59 
Denmark  0.46 58.6 0.0 -0.14 
France  0.38 89.5 0.7 0.08 
Germany  0.28 54.7 0.9 -0.22 
Greece  0.22 91.4 0.6 -0.21 
Hungary  0.18 24.0 0.0 -0.84 
Ireland  0.79 67.7 2.8 1.28 
Italy  0.42 52.8 1.1 0.05 
Latvia  0.32 8.5 0.0 -0.68 
Lithuania  0.36 12.8 0.0 -0.59 
Luxembourg  0.28 144.6 1.9 0.56 
Netherlands  0.20 131.7 1.5 0.23 
Norway  0.42 39.7 1.6 0.14 
Poland  0.29 16.7 0.0 -0.69 
Portugal  0.44 46.2 2.1 0.36 
Romania  0.44 5.5 0.0 -0.48 
Russia  0.44 33.2 0.0 -0.32 
Slovakia  0.29 5.3 0.0 -0.75 
Spain  0.37 79.9 0.5 -0.02 
Sweden  0.33 112.3 1.8 0.43 
Switzerland  0.27 249.0 4.1 1.74 
Ukraine  0.08 5.9 0.0 -1.12 
UK  0.95 157.7 3.3 2.24 
Avg.  0.38 59.8 1.0 0 












Table A2  
Descriptive statistics for the ALL FIRM sample of twenty-seven countries 
This table reports results for the ALL FIRM sample, i.e., all private and listed firms in the Amadeus database in 
December 2006 that meet the following requirements: firm status is active, according to the database; sales, assets, 
operating profit, incorporation year, and industry are reported; and net sales are at least €50 million. Firms 
incorporated in countries not covered by Djankov et al. (2008) are excluded. Also excluded are firms in Fama-
French forty-eight industries with less than ten firms in total. FirmAge is measured in hundreds of years.  
Country Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech R. Denmark France Germany Greece 
Sample firms 39 1,499 14 87 311 1,127 4,801 2,189 319 
Family firms 11 59 4 34 24 115 1,097 527 107 
Median assets 91 60.8 74.2 84 69.1 77.6 77 105.2 97.9 
Median sales 186.1 113.3 94.1 107 115.6 119.2 115.2 149.8 112.4 
Median FirmAge 
(yrs.) 16 21 13 15 13 15 21 18 23 
          
Country Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxemb. Netherl. Norway Poland 
Sample firms 175 122 2,716 13 16 7 1,373 979 133 
Family firms 3 35 567 4 10 1 28 127 31 
Median assets 52 91.2 84 22.1 44.4 77.4 92.2 86.7 59.3 
Median sales 126.5 125.5 105.6 82.7 91.5 255.6 145.7 119.5 99.2 
Median FirmAge 
(yrs.) 13 17 25 10 13 15 20 15 15 
          
Country Portugal Romania Russia Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerl. Ukraine UK 
Sample firms 350 155 507 50 1,039 1,568 219 272 7,604 
Family firms 56 43 17 1 157 65 26 44 1,687 
Median assets 101.1 62.8 81.3 19.4 87.1 80.8 337.1 79.5 87.4 
Median sales 111.8 96.9 129.8 100.3 112.2 121.1 312.7 118.9 130.9 
Median FirmAge 
(yrs.) 23.5 10 14 11.5 20 24 46 11.5 17 
 
 
 
